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Abstract
Most healthcare organisations are service-oriented, fundamentally centred on critical services
provided by medical and nursing staff. Increasingly, these human-centric services rely on software-
intensive systems, i.e. medical devices and health informatics, for improving different aspects of
healthcare, e.g. enhancing efficiency through automation and patient safety through smart alarm
systems. However, many healthcare services are categorised as high risk and as such it is vital
to analyse the ways in which the software-based systems can contribute to unintentional harm
and potentially compromise patient safety. This paper proposes an approach to modelling and
analysing Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs) used in healthcare, with emphasis on identifying
and classifying potential hazardous behaviour. The paper also considers how the safety case for
these SOAs can be developed in a modular manner. The approach is illustrated through a case
study based on three services: ambulance, electronic health records and childbirth services.
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1 Introduction
Healthcare organisations are structured based on different, yet interdependent, services [1],
e.g. emergency and urgent care services, cancer services and ambulance services. Many of
these services are supported by software-intensive systems. These systems include medical
devices [23] (e.g. infusion pumps) and networked health IT systems (e.g. distributed
Electronic Health Record (EHR) systems). There is also an increased interest in improving
the integration between the different healthcare services through enhancing software and
data interoperability and standardising the interfaces between the health IT infrastructures
and medical devices [2, 3, 4].
Despite their significant benefits, software-based services and systems can pose risks
to patient safety [5, 6]. For example, between 2005 and 2009, the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) received over 56,000 reports of issues related to the use of infusion
pumps [7]. Many of the safety issues were traced to software defects. In the UK, the Medicines
and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) reported a continuous increase in
medical device adverse incidents, totalling 9099 reports in 2009 [8]. The British Medical
Journal (BMJ) also reported a significant increase in medical device recalls and warnings [9].
Given the criticality of certain software systems, e.g. EHR, assessing the extent to which
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the software behaviour contributes to safety hazards in healthcare services should be an
integral part of the clinical risk assessment process and the overall clinical safety case [10, 11].
These safety hazards arise in clinical environments that are centred on the interactions
between many different human, procedural and technological elements. Understanding and
controlling the complex links between the software behaviour and the emergence of the
clinical hazards (i.e. potential to cause preventable/unintentional harm) is a significant
challenge. Addressing this challenge at the clinical level requires close collaboration between
different stakeholders, primarily clinical experts, health scientists, safety analysts and system
and software engineers. At the level of software systems, software engineers need to analyse
failures within, and between, the software-intensive healthcare systems (e.g. incorrect dosage
information provided automatically to an infusion pump by the EHR system [2]). Jointly
with clinical experts, these engineers should also analyse how these failures can become
hazardous behaviours once situated within a clinical environment (e.g. inaccurate blood
pressure data due to physical factors such as the height of an IV bag [12]). Unfortunately,
inadequate interaction between clinical experts and software engineers remains a major
hurdle for achieving effective risk assessment of software-intensive healthcare services [13].
Importantly, assurance has to be provided that the risk of the software hazardous
behaviours, identified in the clinical risk assessment process, has been adequately mitigated.
Increasingly, this is being communicated in the form of a safety or assurance case [7, 10, 11].
Safety cases provide a reasoned and structured argument of how the available evidence,
generated from testing and analysis, supports overall claims made about system safety. For a
complex clinical environment, the overall safety case is not monolithic but compositional [14],
comprising different safety arguments and evidence for the various healthcare services. These
services, including systems and processes developed by different organisations, are clearly
interdependent and so are their corresponding safety arguments [21].
This paper focuses on the safety assessment of services within healthcare Service-Oriented
Architectures (SOAs). It presents a preliminary approach to modelling and analysing SOAs
used in healthcare, with emphasis on identifying and classifying potential hazardous software
behaviour. The approach is based on two existing modelling techniques for specifying indi-
vidual services, and the processes connecting them, namely the Service oriented architecture
Modelling Language (SoaML) [15] and the Business Process Modelling Notation (BPMN) [16].
This approach also builds on adapting two existing safety analysis techniques, namely the
Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) [17] and Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution
in Design (SHARD) [18]. Further, the paper explores how the safety case for the SOA can
be developed in a modular manner using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [19]. The
approach is illustrated through examples from an exploratory case study based on three
services: ambulance, electronic health records and childbirth services.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. An overview of the proposed SOA safety
assessment approach is presented in Section 2, followed by a more detailed description of the
safety analysis techniques in Sections 3 and 4. The safety analysis is illustrated in Section 5
using an exploratory case study. The nature and potential structure of a modular safety case
for SOA are discussed in Section 6, followed by conclusions in Section 7.
2 SOA Safety Assessment
A service has been defined as “a value delivered to another through a well-defined interface
and available to a community” [15]. The value that a service delivers, and the safety risks
associated with it, can only be realised and understood in the sociotechnical setting of the
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Figure 1 SOA Safety Assessment.
service (e.g. interactions between different types of services and processes). One approach
to designing and representing this setting, especially for software-based services, is through
an SOA. An SOA “provides a paradigm for defining how people, organizations, and systems
provide and use services to achieve results” [15].
For healthcare services, the SOA paradigm can assist in the assessment of patient safety,
in which accidents predominantly occur as a result of the interaction of different human,
system and organisational behaviours. An overview of the SOA safety assessment approach
proposed in this paper is depicted in Figure 1, and is briefly introduced in the rest of this
section. A more detailed description of the safety analyses is provided in the next two
sections.
Healthcare services, including interfaces and contracts between these services, are modelled
in this approach using SoaML. The SoaML models depict a modular description of the
healthcare SOA in which related contracts, interfaces and operations are encapsulated in,
and provided by, self-contained services. In order to identify the hazards associated with
services, we propose a variant of FHA, called Service Hazard Analysis (SHA), based on
analysing three potential service deviations [17]: (1) service not provided when required, (2)
service provided when not required and (3) incorrect service. The primary output of SHA is
a set of safety requirements defined at the service level.
Next, in order to analyse the causes of the service hazards, identified using SHA, the
detailed tasks implementing the SOA services and processes are modelled in BPMN, focusing
particularly on the flow of information between interacting tasks. The SHARD safety
analysis technique [18], which is a variant of the hazard and operability study (HAZOP)
technique [20], is adapted to analyse the flow of information between the tasks represented
within the SOA processes. We refer to this as Service Failure Analysis (SFA). The analysis
and resulting failure modes are driven by the application of a set of guidewords: omission,
commission, early, late and incorrect value [18]. Each of the failure modes is then associated
with specific service faults linked to existing SOA fault taxonomies (i.e. to make the analysis
SOA-specific [25]). The output of this analysis is a set of derived service safety requirements.
Finally, the above analyses are used as a core part of the safety evidence base to inform the
structure of the overall safety argument for the SOA safety case. Given the modular nature
of SOA, the safety argument is structured based on different, yet interrelated, argument
modules [14]. Most of these argument modules correspond to the safety justification of a
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Figure 2 ServicesArchitecture Model.
specific individual service. Typically, within SOA, services interact based on pre-defined
Service-Level Agreements (SLAs) [22]. Similarly, the relationship between different argument
modules can be specified using argument contracts [14]. The mapping between SLAs and
the argument contracts drives the overall structure of the SOA safety argument and offers
traceability between the design, represented in the SOA models, and the safety assurance,
represented in the modular safety argument.
3 Service Hazard Analysis (SHA)
Safety analysis processes are centred on identifying, analysing and managing hazards. For
healthcare SOA, identifying the hazards associated with the services is essential for defining
the service safety requirements, which should influence the architectural design. In this
paper, hazard identification and classification is carried out based on SHA, using a high-level
representation of the SOA in SoaML. SHA consists of four steps:
1. Identify a service: high-level services are captured in SoaML ServicesArchitecture mod-
els. A ServicesArchitecture represents how Participants collaborate, by producing and
consuming Services to achieve goals. Figure 2 shows an example ServicesArchitecture
model that captures Participants (e.g. ambulance crew, patient and hospital-admission)
and Services (e.g. Request ambulance, Examine patient and Update health record).
2. Identify the service failure modes: the modes or types of failures that are considered in
this step are as follows: (1) service not provided when required, (2) service provided when
not required and (3) incorrect provision of service. These are intended for use as prompts
for identifying the different ways in which the service can fail. The use of these types
requires the safety analyst to interpret the meaning and relevance of specific failures in
the context of the service in hand (e.g. incorrect drug dosage has to be interpreted in the
context of specific classes of drugs for specific conditions or combinations of conditions).
3. Determine the safety effects and severity of each service failure mode: the adverse
consequences of the failure mode should be determined, taking into consideration different
factors, e.g. the condition of the patient and other services and systems (not just the
software systems). A safety classification should also be defined (e.g. Catastrophic, Major,
Considerable or Significant), typically based on Hazard/Risk Matrices (HRM) defined in
standards or by the healthcare organisation [10, 11]. In terms of determining the effects
of service failures, a useful feature of SoaML ServicesArchitecture models is that they
include a representation of service interaction and the Participants that use these services
(i.e. making it easier for the analyst to trace the effects of a failure mode). For example,
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administrating certain drugs or treatments (e.g. radiotherapy) might have potential
hazardous effects on both the patients and the caregivers (both represented as SoaML
Participants).
4. Provide recommendations or service safety requirements: based on the identified
failure modes and their classification, recommendations, preferably in the form of service
safety requirements, should be generated, where the rigor/integrity with which the
requirements need be met should be proportionate to the severity of the failures (i.e.
higher degrees of severity requires more stringent integrity requirements and more rigorous
processes) [24, 27]. SHA is implementation-independent and should be performed at the
early specification and design stages of the SOA.
4 Service Failure Analysis (SFA)
Service hazards identified using SHA typically emerge from a combination of factors, whether
human, organisational or technological. Understanding and analysing the causes of these
hazards is an important step towards eliminating or reducing the risk of these hazards. In
this section we introduce SFA to examine the detailed implementation of the services, and
identify how failures, specifically interaction/information flow failures, can contribute to
service hazards. SFA consists of five steps:
1. Identify a flow between two tasks: SFA, as proposed in this paper, is based on a
behavioural model of the SOA represented in BPMN [16]. BPMN provides the ability to
communicate and represent internal procedures, based on Processes, using a graphical
and structured notation. Typically, these Processes represent workflows of connected
Tasks (i.e. atomic Activities), grouped into Swimlanes (i.e. a container for organising
Activities). Figure 4 shows an example BPMN process model, comprising connected
Tasks that are organised into five different Swimlanes (e.g. ambulance crew, patient and
hospital-admission). The SoaML model used for SHA (Section 3) and the BPMN model
used for SFA, in this section, are linked are follows (Figure 3): Services in SoaML interact
through defined Contracts. These Contracts have explicit Interfaces that offer a number
of Operations. Each of these Operations is then linked to a Task in BPMN, enabling
traceability between the different models at different abstraction levels. Further, each
Participant in SoaML is represented as a Swimlane in BPMN. This step in SFA involves
the selection of a link between two BPMN Tasks that captures a flow in terms of inputs,
outputs, data, sequence and timing.
2. Identify flow failure modes: similar to Step 2 in SHA, this step uses a number of
guidewords, this time based on SHARD, to determine the ways in which the selected
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flow can deviate from its intended usage. Five guidewords are used here: omission,
commission, early, late and value [18]. The failures derived from the use of each of these
guidewords should be interpreted in the context of the SOA design.
3. Determine the potential causes of each flow failure mode: causes can be a combination
of technical, human and organisational events or conditions. For technical causes in
particular, we use the SOA fault taxonomy developed by Bruning et al [25]. This fault
taxonomy is well structured and categorises faults based on the SOA lifecycle phase in
which they can emerge: (1) publishing, (2) discovery, (3) composition, (4) binding and (5)
execution faults. The advantage of using these fault types is that they are SOA-specific.
However, again, these fault types should be used as prompts or hints for safety analysts
rather than as an exhaustive list of all possible SOA faults.
4. Determine the potential effects of each flow failure mode: the potential effects should
be recorded and should be examined in terms of the contribution that they can make to
the hazardous service failure modes, identified in SHA, or possibly the contribution that
they might make to new hazardous behaviours (i.e. missed during SHA).
5. Provide detailed safety requirements or design recommendations: where a failure
mode contributes to one or more hazards, one or more safety requirements should be
defined to address the failure mode. Further, some design recommendations could be
made for addressing the failure mode, e.g. based on existing safety tactics in the software
architecture literature or SOA-specific dependability tactics (e.g. in [26], which are
centred on the use of service redundancy, diversity, graceful degradation, monitoring and
containment).
5 Exploratory Case Study
In this section, we illustrate the use of SHA and SFA using extracts from an exploratory case
study, which is based on three healthcare services: ambulance, EHR and childbirth services.
A subset of these services is represented in the SoaML ServicesArchitecture model shown
in Figure 2. It covers the services used (i.e. produced and consumed) from the point a phone
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call is made to request an ambulance (for a pregnant woman) to the point at which the
patient is admitted to a hospital (labour ward). Another set of ServicesArchitecture models
was created to capture subsequent stages e.g. fetal monitoring, first and second stages of
labour, caesarean section and postnatal care (not discussed further in this paper).
Table 1 shows an extract from the SHA results when applied to the Dispatch Ambulance
service. The analysis establishes the potential safety criticality of the Dispatch Ambulance
service, based on the severity of the worst credible effects of the identified failure modes,
leading to stringent safety requirements allocated to the Dispatch Ambulance service.
As can be observed from the results, the analysis is collaborative in nature, demanding
inputs from both engineers (e.g. determining how the service can fail) and clinicians (e.g.
assessing effects on patients). Figure 4 presents a more detailed model of the SOA using
BPMN, with more emphasis of the SOA process. BPMN Tasks in this process are mapped
into the Operations in the Interfaces provided by each SoaML Service while BPMN Swimlanes
are mapped onto the SoaML Participants.
Considering each flow between the Tasks, SFA was applied to the BPMN model. A sample
outcome is shown in Table 2, considering the last flow in the BPMN model, from Provide
patient health record to the End object (i.e. admission to labour ward). The analysis shows
how the lack of patient information from the EHR, and more seriously incorrect information,
can potentially lead to adverse patient complications.
6 SOA Safety Cases
Establishing and justifying an acceptable level of confidence in the safety of software-based
healthcare services will often require different safety arguments and evidence generated by
different service owners or providers. One approach to representing this compositionality
of the overall safety case for service-based systems is through modular GSN [19]. Modular
GSN supports the definition of the safety case based on the composition of different, but
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interrelated, argument modules. When argument modules are composed a record of the
agreement and consistency can be recorded using a safety case contract [14]. This contract
“contains definition of the relationships between two modules, defining how a claim in one
supports the argument in the other” [19].
Modularity in the definition of services lends itself to the concept of modular safety cases.
Service owners or producers often rely on other services when guaranteeing and providing
their own services. Similarly, claims in certain argument modules can only be said to be
substantiated (the guarantee clause) if claims or evidence are available in other argument
modules that offer sufficient support (the rely clause). Figure 5 shows a preliminary GSN
modular structure for the safety case for the healthcare SOA considered in the case study in
the previous section. The safety case has three categories of argument modules:
Top-Level Argument Module includes a hazard-directed argument, which covers the main
safety claims concerning the identified service hazards, including interaction hazards;
Ambulance Service Argument Module, EHR Service Argument Module, Hospital Admission
Service Argument Module and Service Interactions Argument Module include hazard
mitigation arguments for the hazards posed by the different services and their interactions;
and
Ambulance Crew and Call Centre Argument Module, EHR System Argument Module and
Hospital Admission Argument Module include detailed arguments concerning the systems
and organisations responsible for implementing the healthcare services.
However, the safety case structure in Figure 5 and the case study description in Section 5
do not take into account that in larger regions (which include sub-regions), the same types
of healthcare services can be offered by a variety of different ambulance service providers
and hospitals. In such situations, the high-level argument structure in Figure 5, comprising
the top-level hazard-directed argument module and hazard mitigation argument modules
potentially need not change. Where the implementation of the provision of services changes,
the bottom tier safety argument structure will need to change. For example, if a healthcare
region was divided into two sub-regions, say east and west, with different hospitals, ambulance
crews and call centres, then the safety arguments concerning the systems and organisations
implementing the healthcare services would be different, taking into account the specific
design and operational issues concerning these systems and organisations.
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Figure 6 shows a modified representation of the safety case structure in Figure 5, taking
into consideration the need for two different safety arguments (east and west) for each of
these argument modules: Ambulance Crew and Call Centre Argument Module and Hospital
Admission Argument Module. However, it can be noticed that the Ambulance Service
Argument Module and Hospital Admission Service Argument Module are now supported by
the Ambulance Crew and Call Centre Argument Module and Hospital Admission Argument
Module (east and west) via two contract modules. This loose coupling between these argument
modules can help in minimising the impact of change to the safety case when different systems
and organisations are used to provide the services (e.g. a third sub-region is introduced).
7 Conclusions
This paper has presented a preliminary approach to integrating safety assessment into the
design of healthcare SOA, covering three aspects: modelling using SoaML and BPMN, safety
analysis using SHA and SFA (adapting FHA and SHARD) and safety assurance using modular
GSN. An exploratory case study was also discussed, based on three services: ambulance,
electronic health records and childbirth services. We are currently developing a tool-support
platform for the above safety assessment approach in order to improve traceability between
the design, safety analysis and safety assurance models and provide automated means for
supporting the safety analysis process. We are also developing a set of modular safety
argument patterns that analysts can use as a basis for structuring SOA safety arguments.
Finally, examining the safety impact of interactions between services and service providers
remains a significant challenge, especially for healthcare services that span both primary
and secondary care and cover more than one medical condition (e.g. care and treatment of
diabetes in pregnancy which involves GPs, obstetricians, midwives, endocrinologists, and
diabetes-specialist nurses). Our future work will examine means for identifying, modelling
and analysing these interactions by integrating search-based technologies (e.g. simulation
and model-checking) into the above SOA safety assessment approach.
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